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WHERE IS FELIX COHEN WHEN WE NEED 
HIM?: TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE AND 
THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
CORPORATIONS 
 
John Hasnas* 
INTRODUCTION 
Felix Cohen began Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach,1 perhaps the most entertaining law review 
article ever written, by describing a heaven of legal concepts in 
which could be found “all the logical instruments needed to 
manipulate and transform . . . legal concepts and thus to create and 
to solve the most beautiful of legal problems.”2 This heaven, which 
contained  
a dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press 
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1 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). 
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an indefinite number of meanings out of any text or statute, 
an apparatus for constructing fictions, and a hair-splitting 
machine that could divide a single hair into 999,999 equal 
parts and, when operated by the most expert jurists, could 
split each of these parts again into 999,999 equal parts . . . 
[was] open to all properly qualified jurists, provided only 
they drank the Lethean draught which induced 
forgetfulness of terrestrial human affairs.3  
This was the realm of transcendental nonsense in which legal 
questions were resolved by examining the relationships among 
abstract concepts divorced from any consideration of the practical 
consequences or ethical quality of the decision.  
As his first illustration of transcendental nonsense, Cohen 
selected the law’s treatment of corporations. He pointed out that in 
deciding whether a corporation incorporated in one state could be 
sued in the courts of another, one might expect courts to make 
“some factual inquiry into the practice of modern corporations in 
choosing their sovereigns and into the actual significance of the 
relationship between a corporation and the state of its 
incorporation,”4 to consider “the difficulties that injured plaintiffs 
may encounter if they have to bring suit against corporate 
defendants in the state of incorporation . . . [and] the possible 
hardship to corporations of having to defend actions in many 
states, considering the legal facilities available to corporate 
defendants,”5 and to decide the case “[o]n the basis of facts 
revealed by such an inquiry, and on the basis of certain political or 
ethical value judgments as to the propriety of putting financial 
burdens upon corporations . . . .”6 Yet, when the New York Court 
of Appeals was called upon to rule on this matter, “[i]nstead of 
addressing itself to such economic, sociological, political, or 
ethical questions . . . , the court addressed itself to the question, 
‘Where is a corporation?’ Was this corporation really in 
Pennsylvania or in New York, or could it be in two places at 
                                                          
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 810. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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once?”7 
But how is such a question to be answered? As Cohen pointed 
out,  
Clearly the question of where a corporation is, when it 
incorporates in one state and has agents transacting 
corporate business in another state, is not a question that 
can be answered by empirical observation. Nor is it a 
question that demands for its solution any analysis of 
political considerations or social ideals. It is, in fact, a 
question identical in metaphysical status with the question 
which scholastic theologians are supposed to have argued 
at great length, “How many angels can stand on the point of 
a needle?”8 
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the corporation could be sued in 
New York because by maintaining an office there, the corporation 
had come into the state.9 The problem with this ruling is that  
[n]obody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we 
to believe in corporations if we don’t believe in angels? To 
be sure, some of us have seen corporate funds, corporate 
transactions, etc. . . . But this does not give us the right to 
hypostatize, to “thingify,” the corporation, and to assume 
that it travels about from State to State as mortal men 
travel. Surely we are qualifying as inmates of . . . [the] 
heaven of legal concepts when we approach a legal 
problem in these essentially supernatural terms.10 
Deciding cases by reifying the abstract concept of the corporation 
is a classic example of transcendental nonsense. 
Cohen warned us against settling controversial legal questions 
on the basis of transcendental nonsense seventy-five years ago. In 
this Article, I argue that his warning is still timely, and is equally 
applicable to moral controversies—specifically, to the question of 
whether corporations can and should be held morally responsible 
for the actions of their agents. In Parts I and II, I review the 
philosophical literature on this question and suggest that it shares 
                                                          
7 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
8 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
9 Id. at 811. 
10 Id. 
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many features of the transcendental decision-making that Cohen 
decried. In Part III, I apply a more practically-oriented method of 
analysis to the question—what Cohen might call the “functional 
approach”11—and suggest that attributing moral responsibility to 
corporations as collective entities is either without practical 
significance or ethically pernicious. 
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT OF THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
OF CORPORATIONS 
How do philosophers attempt to determine whether it makes 
sense to ascribe moral responsibility to corporations? Most begin 
by asking straightforwardly whether a corporation is the type of 
thing that can bear moral responsibility.12 This question launches a 
quest to compile a list of the characteristics something must 
possess to be a moral agent. Once the list has been populated, the 
nature of the corporation is examined to determine whether 
corporations possess each of the necessary characteristics. If they 
do, philosophers conclude that corporations are subject to moral 
blame (or praise) for their actions;13 if they do not, the contrary 
                                                          
11 See infra Part III for a discussion of the “functional approach.” 
12 See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY ch. 2 
(1982); PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS ch. 2 
(1985); David Copp, Collective Actions and Secondary Actions, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 
177 (1979); Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. 
Q. 207 (1979) [hereinafter French, Corporation as a Moral Person]; Kenneth E. 
Goodpaster & John B. Mathews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have a Conscience? 60 
HARV. BUS. REV. 132 (1982); Virginia Held, Can a Random Collection of 
Individuals Be Morally Responsible?, 67 J. PHIL. 471 (1970); Michael Keeley, 
Organizations as Non-persons, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 149 (1979); John Ladd, 
Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 MONIST 488 
(1970) [hereinafter Ladd, Morality]; Larry May, Vicarious Agency and 
Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69 (1983); David T. Ozar, The Moral 
Responsibility of Corporations, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS. 294 (Thomas 
Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 1st ed. 1979); Philip Pettit, 
Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171 (2007); Michael J. Phillips, 
Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the Corporation, 2 
BUS. ETHICS Q. 435, 453 (1992); Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate 
Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531 (2003) [hereinafter Velasquez, 
Debunking Corporate]. 
13 See, e.g., DONALDSON, supra note 12; WERHANE, supra note 12; French, 
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conclusion is drawn.14 
The seminal work in this regard is Peter French’s The 
Corporation as a Moral Person.15 There, French identified two 
necessary conditions for moral responsibility: (1) causation—that a 
subject be capable of acting so as to be the cause of an event—and 
(2) intentionality—that “the action in question was intended by the 
subject or that the event was the direct result of an intentional act 
of the subject.”16 French then argued that because all corporations 
have institutional decision-making procedures—what he labeled 
corporate internal decision (CID) structures17—corporations can 
both cause events and act intentionally. These CID structures 
“accomplish[] a subordination and synthesis of the intentions and 
acts of various biological persons into a corporate decision.”18 
Thus, “[a] functioning CID Structure incorporates acts of 
biological persons.”19 When a corporation takes an action pursuant 
to its CID structure, “it is proper to describe it as having been done 
for corporate reasons, as having been caused by a corporate desire 
coupled with a corporate belief and so, in other words, as corporate 
intentional.”20 For French, this was sufficient to show not only that 
corporations are proper subjects of moral responsibility, but also 
that they are “full-fledged moral persons and have whatever 
privileges, rights and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, 
accorded to moral persons.”21 
French’s argument was immediately attacked on the grounds 
                                                          
Corporation as a Moral Person, supra note 12, Goodpaster & Mathews, supra 
note 12; Ozar, supra note 12; Pettit, supra note 12; Phillips, supra note 12.  
14 See, e.g., Keeley, supra note 12; Ladd, Morality, supra note 12; May, 
supra note 12; Velasquez, Debunking Corporate, supra note 12.  
15 French, Corporation as a Moral Person, supra note 12. 
16 Id. at 211. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 212. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 213. 
21 Id. at 207. David Ozar advanced a similar argument in favor of corporate 
moral responsibility. Ozar too claimed that the formal and informal rules of the 
organization “determine that some activities associated with the group are to 
count as actions of the group as a single entity.” Ozar, supra note 12, at 296. 
Because groups can therefore act in their own right, Ozar concluded that they 
may be held morally responsible for such actions. Id. at 297. 
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that its premises were too weak to establish its conclusion—
specifically, that being an intentional causal agent is not sufficient 
for moral personhood. For example, Thomas Donaldson pointed 
out that both a cat about to attack a mouse and a computer 
alphabetizing a list of names can be said to act intentionally, yet 
neither thereby qualifies as a moral person.22 Patricia Werhane 
similarly argued that French’s argument could not establish 
corporate moral personhood because “although [corporations] 
indeed have some of the characteristics of persons, they lack the 
autonomy necessary to perform primary actions, one of the 
conditions necessary to be ascribed full personhood.”23 In addition, 
Donaldson contended that there were good reasons to believe that 
corporations cannot be moral persons. As French recognized, his 
argument implied that corporations “have whatever privileges, 
rights and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to 
moral persons.”24 But Donaldson claimed that this is either 
undesirable—do we really want corporations to have the right to 
vote?—or impossible—what could it mean to say that corporations 
have the right to worship as they please or to pursue happiness?25  
Despite their criticism of French’s argument on this ground, 
both Donaldson and Werhane argued that corporations can be held 
morally responsible. This is because full moral personhood is not 
necessary for moral responsibility—although all moral persons are 
morally responsible, subjects that do not satisfy all the 
requirements of moral personhood can nevertheless be morally 
responsible agents. To demonstrate this, both Donaldson and 
Werhane supplied their own set of necessary conditions for moral 
agency. According to Donaldson, to qualify as a moral agent, a 
corporation need only “embody a process of moral decision-
making.”26 This gives rise to two necessary conditions: (1) “[t]he 
capacity to use moral reasons in decision-making,” and (2) “[t]he 
capacity of the decision-making process to control not only overt 
                                                          
22 See DONALDSON, supra note 12, at 22.  
23 WERHANE, supra note 12, at 57. 
24 French, Corporation as a Moral Person, supra note 12, at 207. 
25 See DONALDSON, supra note 12, at 22–23.  
26 Id. at 30. 
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corporate acts, but also the structure of policies and rules.”27 
Donaldson claimed that many, if not most, corporations meet 
these two requirements. While admitting that corporations “are 
unable to think as humans,” he argued that corporations can be 
morally accountable in the sense that “with the proper internal 
structure, corporations, like humans, can be liable to give an 
account of their behavior where the account stipulates which moral 
reasons prompted their behavior.”28 Further, there is no reason 
why a corporation’s internal decision procedures cannot be applied 
self-referentially so that it is the corporation itself that controls the 
creation and “maintenance of the corporation’s decision-making 
machinery.”29 Hence, although not moral persons, corporations can 
nevertheless be morally responsible agents.  
Werhane suggested a different set of necessary conditions for 
moral agency: (1) the capacity to act, and (2) the ability to form 
intentions.30 Werhane contended that corporations have the 
capacity to act because they can undertake secondary actions—
actions taken by individual corporate agents who are authorized to 
act on behalf of the corporation by the corporate charter and by-
laws as interpreted and amended by the board of directors, 
corporate management, and market forces.31 These are true 
corporate actions because they “cannot be redescribed in terms of 
the actions of constituents.”32 Further, Werhane agreed with 
French that the corporate structure incorporates the intentions of 
individual human beings. Thus, 
a corporate intentional system combines the sum of the 
decision-making procedures carried out by boards of 
directors, stockholders at annual meetings, management, 
foremen, and other employees, with the advice of outside 
agents such as lawyers, accountants, and public relations 
persons, which together form collective “corporate” 
“intentions” that are exhibited in “corporate decision-
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 WERHANE, supra note 12, at 57–59.  
31 Id. at 52–56. 
32 Id. at 56. 
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making,” corporate “action,” and organizational goals.33 
Thus, although corporations are not moral persons, they, “like 
persons, are and should be, held morally responsible for actions 
within their control . . . .”34 
French himself was sufficiently influenced by objections such 
as Donaldson’s and Werhane’s to abandon his claim that 
corporations were moral persons.35 In his subsequent work, French 
tempered his position by recognizing that to be morally 
responsible, one need only be a moral “actor.”36 Then, in keeping 
with the usual philosophical approach, he proposed a set of 
necessary conditions an entity must satisfy to be a moral actor. 
These are: (1) “the ability to act intentionally,”—i.e., have 
“purposes, plans, goals, and interests that motivate some of its 
behavior”;37 (2) “the ability to make rational decisions and to 
consider rational arguments regarding their intentions”;38 and (3) 
“the facility to respond to events and ethical criticism by altering 
intentions and patterns of behavior that are harmful (or offensive) 
to others or detrimental to their own interests.”39 French then 
adapted his earlier argument to show that because corporations 
possessed CID structures, they satisfied each of these conditions.40  
Another example of the conventional approach to the question 
of corporate moral responsibility is supplied by Philip Pettit. In his 
article, Responsibility Incorporated,41 Pettit supplies three 
necessary conditions for moral responsibility: (1) value 
relevance—the subject “is an autonomous agent and faces a value 
relevant choice involving the possibility of doing something good 
or bad or right or wrong”;42 (2) value judgment—the subject “has 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 59. 
35 See PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS 10 (1995). 
36 See id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 12. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 15 (“It is the corporation’s CID structure that allows it to be an 
independent rational actor on the social scene, and that converts various human 
behaviors and actions into corporate intentional action.”). 
41 See generally Pettit, supra note 12.  
42 Id. at 175. 
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the understanding and access to evidence required for being able to 
make judgments about the relative value of such options”;43 and 
(3) value sensitivity—the subject “has the control necessary for 
being able to choose between options on the basis of judgments 
about their value.”44 
Pettit argues that corporations satisfy the first condition 
because they can (1) qualify as agents, and (2) act autonomously. 
Corporations qualify as agents “when members act on the shared 
intention that together they should realize the conditions that 
ensure agency,”45 which they do by acting in accordance with a 
constitution “whereby the members of a group might each be 
assigned roles in the generation of an action-suited body of desire 
and belief and in the performance of the actions that it supports.”46 
Further, corporations can act autonomously because the 
corporation’s judgment cannot be reduced to the judgment of the 
individuals who comprise it. Thus, “[a]utonomy is intuitively 
guaranteed by the fact that on one or more issues the judgment of 
the group will have to be functionally independent of the 
corresponding member judgments, so that its intentional attitudes 
as a whole are most saliently unified by being, precisely, the 
attitudes of the group.”47 
Pettit claims that corporations satisfy the second and third 
conditions as well. They can form value judgments “over a certain 
proposition when the proposition is presented for consideration and 
the group takes whatever steps are prescribed in the constitution 
for endorsing it.”48 Thus, they are “able to form a judgment over 
any proposition that members are capable of presenting for 
consideration and of adjudicating by means of a vote or something 
of the kind.”49 Further, they are value sensitive because they  
may control in a reason-sensitive way for the performance 
of a certain action by some members, maybe these or 
                                                          
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 179. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 184. 
48 Id. at 186. 
49 Id. at 187. 
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maybe those. [They] will do this, by maintaining a 
constitution for the formation and enactment of [their] 
attitudes, arranging things so that some individual or 
individuals are identified as the agents to perform a 
required task, and other individuals are identified as agents 
to ensure that should the performers fail, there will be 
others to take their place as backups.50 
Once the philosophical advocates of corporate moral 
responsibility have identified the necessary conditions for moral 
responsibility, the debate shifts to whether corporations can satisfy 
them. Critics argue that they cannot. For example, Manuel 
Velasquez attacked French’s initial causation requirement on the 
ground that corporations lack the ability to act. He argued that  
moral responsibility for an act . . . can be attributed only to 
that agent who originated the act in his own body, that is, in 
the movements of a body over which he has direct control. 
In corporate agency, action does not originate in a body 
belonging to the corporation to whom the act is attributed, 
but in bodies belonging to those human beings whose direct 
movements constituted or brought about the act that is then 
attributed to the corporation. Consequently, whether 
considered as a fictional legal entity or as a real 
organization, corporations do not originate acts in the 
manner required by attributions of moral responsibility—
namely, by directly moving one’s own body.51 
More typically, however, the debate centers on the question of 
whether corporations can form intentions, which almost all 
advocates of corporate moral responsibility list as a necessary 
condition. For example, Michael Keeley responded to French’s 
original argument by claiming that corporations cannot be moral 
persons because “organizations have no intentions or goals at 
all.”52 Keeley contended that although an organization’s CID 
structure “may serve to identify organizational behavior, [it does] 
                                                          
50 Id. at 192. 
51 Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible 
for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 7 (1983) [hereinafter 
Velasquez, Why Corporations]. 
52 Keeley, supra note 12, at 149. 
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not ordinarily establish the organizational intent of that behavior or 
that it has any real organizational intent at all.”53 Indeed, although 
French’s appeal to CID structures can show that corporations can 
act “in the sense of producing an effect, it is a large leap to the 
claim that it can act in the sense of intending an effect.”54 
Similarly, John Ladd argued that as formal organizations, 
corporations are capable of only “means-end” rationality.55 He 
recognized that given a predetermined goal, corporations can make 
empirical judgments about the best means to achieve it, but 
contended that corporations have no mechanism by which they can 
process or evaluate normative propositions. Consequently, 
corporations cannot produce moral intentions—intentions to act 
rightly or wrongly in a moral sense. Thus, “for logical reasons, it is 
improper to expect organizational conduct to conform to the 
ordinary principles of morality,”56 and hence, corporations cannot 
be moral agents.57 
Other philosophers pressed similar objections. John Danley 
accused the advocates of corporate moral responsibility of 
equivocating on the meaning of “intention” to stretch it to apply to 
corporations,58 arguing that when used in the appropriate sense 
“[i]ndividuals within the corporation can intend, lust, have malice, 
afterthought, and so forth, but the corporation cannot.”59 In the 
same vein, Manuel Velasquez argued that corporations do not 
possess the integration of body and mind required for intentional 
action because  
an act is intentional only if it is the carrying out of an 
intention formed in the mind of the agent whose bodily 
movements bring about the act . . . . The underlying reason 
                                                          
53 Id. at 151. 
54 Id. at 152. 
55 See Ladd, Morality, supra note 12, at 497–98. 
56 Id. at 499. 
57 Ladd subsequently argued directly against French’s position in John 
Ladd, Corporate Mythology and Individual Responsibility, 2 INT’L. J. APPLIED 
PHIL. 1 (1984). 
58 John R. Danley, Corporate Moral Agency: The Case for Anthropological 
Bigotry, in BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY 
202, 204 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990). 
59 Id. at 203. 
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for corporate policies and procedures being unable to 
generate intentional action is that the concept of intentional 
action . . . is rooted in the concept of an agent with a certain 
mental and bodily unity that corporations do not have.60 
French responded to such objections by noting that the skeptics 
assume that intention requires the presence of human desires and 
beliefs, which, indeed, corporations cannot possess.61 French 
argued that this is incorrect—that intention requires only the ability 
to plan. Plans may flow from desires and beliefs in the case of 
individuals, but such desires and beliefs are not necessary for 
plans, and therefore are not necessary for intention. He argued that  
[to] intend to do something is to plan to do it . . . . My 
intention seems to have little to do with my current desires 
and beliefs. In fact, desires and beliefs are, at most, only 
tangentially involved. My plans and my commitments to 
those plans are at the heart of my intentions.62 
And because corporations’ CID structures produce corporate plans, 
corporations can act intentionally.  
Corporate plans might differ from those that motivate the 
human persons who occupy corporate positions and whose 
bodily movements are necessary for the corporation to act. 
Using its CID Structure, however, the concerted behavior 
of those humans can be described as corporate actions done 
                                                          
60 Velasquez, Why Corporations, supra note 51, at 8. 
61 Indeed, French concedes that his earlier work embodies the same 
assumption, which he now recognizes to be incorrect.  
At the base of my earlier view was the widely-held position that 
intentionality should be understood in terms of a desire/belief complex. 
That position is flawed; indeed, it is downright wrong . . . . 
Corporations cannot, in any normal sense, desire and believe. In my 
earlier accounts I redescribed desires and beliefs into corporate policy 
in order to match the model. Many objected that I had overly 
formalized the notions of desire and belief to fit the Corporate Internal 
Decision (CID) Structure approach I had created. With them I am now 
prepared to say that if intention is no more than desires and beliefs, 
then corporations will fail to make it as intentional actors. 
Peter A. French, Integrity, Intentions, and Corporations, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 141, 
148–49 (1996). 
62 Id. at 148. 
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with a corporate intention, to execute a corporate plan or as 
part of such a plan.63 
The change of focus from desires and beliefs to plans did not 
convince many of the skeptics that corporations can truly have 
intentions. For example, Manuel Velasquez continued to argue that  
[t]he problem with French’s claim . . . is that there is 
nothing about procedures and policies that can enable them 
to transform a metaphorical intention into a real one. 
Procedures and policies, however simple or complex, 
cannot create group mental states nor group minds in any 
literal sense . . . . Human intentions, beliefs, and desires are 
mental; that is, they are essentially, by definition, the sort 
of things that can be present to, and in, our conscious 
minds: the sorts of things that we can be conscious of. This 
means that if an organization has such intentions, beliefs, 
and desires, it must have a conscious mind, a mind with a 
unified consciousness that encompasses within a single 
field of awareness all of its nonpathological intentions, 
plans, beliefs, and desires . . . The corporation as such does 
not have such a unified consciousness.64 
Other advocates of corporate moral responsibility have recently 
taken up the gauntlet on this question. For example, Denis Arnold 
argues that there is no good reason to identify intention with 
individual human consciousness as Velasquez does.65 Arnold 
argues that intentions may be properly understood as plans or 
“commitments to future action,”66 and when they are, there can be 
shared intentions. Shared intentions consist in the mutual 
intentions of individual parties to engage in a joint activity, the 
meshing sub-plans of the intentions, and the common knowledge 
of the parties of the first two conditions.67 Arnold then argues that 
corporate intentions are the shared intentions of the individuals 
who comprise the corporation as integrated by the corporation’s 
                                                          
63 Id. at 152. 
64 Velasquez, Debunking Corporate, supra note 12, at 546–50. 
65 Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 
279, 284 (2006). 
66 Id. 
67 See id. at 286. 
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CID structure. 
As with shared intentions, corporate intentions are neither a 
set of individual mental states, nor the mental state of some 
superagent. Corporate intentions are states of affairs 
consisting of both the intersecting attitudes of the class of 
agents comprising the corporation and the internal decision 
structure of the organization. The CID structure serves as 
the frame upon which the attitudes of board members, 
executives, managers, and employees are interwoven to 
form corporate intentions.68 
Hence, corporations can satisfy the intentionality requirement for 
corporate moral responsibility. 
And so it goes. At the time of this writing, the philosophical 
debate about whether corporations can meet the necessary 
conditions for moral responsibility is ongoing.69 
II. TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE 
How could there be anything objectionable about this approach 
to the question of corporate moral responsibility? What could be 
more logical then first identifying the conditions necessary for 
moral responsibility and then attempting to determine whether 
corporations meet them? What’s wrong with this method of 
analysis? 
Might I suggest that the problem lies in the nature of the 
question the analysis is designed to answer—to wit, whether a 
corporation is the type of thing that can bear moral responsibility. 
Notice that this question contains an assumption—that a 
corporation is a thing. In this respect, the question has the same 
character as the notorious query: do you still beat your spouse? 
Any attempt to answer it implicitly accepts the embedded 
assumption. It is, however, far from obvious that corporations are 
things in the sense relevant to the ascription of moral 
responsibility. Assuming that they are is precisely the type of 
                                                          
68 Id. at 291. 
69 See, e.g., id. at 279. Indeed, the author has recently reviewed for 
publication an article exploring two distinct versions of shared intentionality that 
may serve as bases for the attribution of moral responsibility to corporations. 
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“thingification” of the corporation that Felix Cohen warned us 
against 75 years ago.70  
The problem with the conventional philosophical arguments 
for corporate moral responsibility may have nothing to do with the 
absence of any particular characteristic associated with moral 
agency, but with the underlying assumption that corporations are 
the type of things upon which such characteristics may be 
predicated. When considering moral agency, it makes perfect sense 
to ask whether an insane person, or a child, or an animal, or a 
computer, or an alien can be morally responsible because in each 
case there is an actual thing to ask about. Given the existence of a 
thing to which it is reasonable to ascribe predicates, one may 
intelligibly ask whether that thing has the characteristics necessary 
for moral responsibility. But a corporation, like the White House, 
Congress, the New York Knicks, and Germany, is not a thing. 
These terms are all abstract collective nouns. They refer to 
complex networks of (constantly changing) human beings who are 
related to each other through certain formal and informal 
arrangements. Although there is a sense in which each of these 
terms refers to something real, none of them refers to a thing that 
has a physical existence in the world. In this context, the White 
House does not refer to the physical building within which the 
President resides. 
Abstract collective nouns are vitally important to our ability to 
communicate effectively. They perform a crucial role in 
facilitating discourse by allowing us to refer to complex human 
arrangements with the convenience of a single term. Hence, we are 
perfectly well understood when we say things like the White 
House is monitoring the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Congress 
is unable to restrain its profligate spending, and the Knicks play 
lousy defense. Similarly, we often speak as though we are 
ascribing responsibility to such abstract entities. Thus, we say 
things like the White House is morally responsible for the abuse of 
detainees in the war on terror, or Congress for the budget deficit, or 
Nazi Germany for the Holocaust, or corporations for the 
wrongdoing of their employees. There is nothing wrong with 
speaking this way as long as we keep in mind that in doing so we 
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are speaking metaphorically. We are using a linguistic shorthand 
for the unwieldy proposition that some set of difficult to identify 
members of an indefinite group of people who are related to each 
other in both formal and informal ways have acted so as to produce 
morally improper results.  
Problems arise, however, when we forget that we are speaking 
metaphorically. Once we forget that abstract collective nouns 
function merely as linguistic placeholders to facilitate 
communication, we begin to think that the abstract collections they 
represent are entities that exist in their own right, and to which 
properties and characteristics may be ascribed. We are then 
tempted to decide questions such as whether the White House is 
morally responsible for the abuse of detainees, or Congress for the 
budget deficit, or Nazi Germany for the Holocaust, or corporations 
for the wrongdoing of their employees by asking whether these 
entities can act, or form intentions, or are autonomous, or exhibit 
value sensitivity. When we succumb to this temptation, we end up 
making ascriptions of moral responsibility purely on the basis of 
the relationships among abstract concepts divorced from any 
consideration of either the practical consequences or the ethical 
appropriateness of the ascriptions. Such behavior is a classic 
example of Cohen’s transcendental nonsense. 
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH? 
Felix Cohen sought to remedy the transcendental nonsense of 
his day with what he called “the functional approach.” I have 
suggested that the contemporary philosophical debate over the 
moral responsibility of corporations consists predominantly of 
transcendental nonsense.71 Can this be remedied with a 
                                                          
71 A small number of philosophers have addressed the question in terms of 
its practical significance. For example, John Danley argues that ascribing moral 
responsibility to corporations is merely “a prelude to many further permissible 
or obligatory moves” such as being required to pay compensation or be subject 
to punishment, and that any consideration of the question was “incomplete 
without incorporating the role it plays in relation to these other moral moves. It 
is this which is lacking from the previous discussion of ‘intend.’” John R. 
Danley, Corporate Moral Agency: The Case for Anthropological Bigotry, in 
BUSINESS ETHICS 202, 205 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 
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contemporary incarnation of Cohen’s functional approach?  
Cohen’s functional approach was designed to analyze and 
morally evaluate controversial legal questions on the basis of their 
practical effects. Accordingly, Cohen identified two of the 
functional approach’s main purposes as “the eradication of 
meaningless concepts”72 and “the abatement of meaningless 
questions.”73 With regard to the first purpose, Cohen asserted that 
“functionalism represents an assault upon all dogmas and devices 
that cannot be translated into terms of actual experience.”74 Noting 
that “[o]ur legal system is filled with supernatural concepts, that is 
to say, concepts which cannot be defined in terms of experience, 
and from which all sorts of empirical decisions are supposed to 
flow,”75 Cohen declared that “[a]gainst these unverifiable concepts 
[the functional approach] presents an ultimatum. Any word that 
cannot pay up in the currency of fact, upon demand, is to be 
declared bankrupt, and we are to have no further dealings with 
it.”76 With regard to the second purpose, Cohen asserted that “[i]t 
is a consequence of the functional attack upon unverifiable 
concepts that many of the traditional problems of science, law, and 
philosophy are revealed as pseudo-problems devoid of meaning.”77 
Thus, questions such as “‘Where is a corporation?’ are in fact 
meaningless, and can serve only as invitations to equally 
                                                          
2d ed. 1990). Similarly, Manuel Velasquez points out that “the concept of moral 
responsibility is conceptually connected to the concepts of blame and 
punishment” such that ascribing moral responsibility to a corporation entails 
“claiming that there are some people in the corporation who should be blamed 
and punished.” Velasquez, Why Corporations, supra note 51, at 10–13. In 
addition, Christopher McMahon explicitly considers the practical consequences 
of attributing moral personhood to corporations to demonstrate that “there are 
moral reasons for denying them the moral status that personhood usually brings 
with it.” Christopher McMahon, The Ontological and Moral Status of 
Organizations, 5 BUS. ETHICS. Q. 541, 547 (1995). Had the philosophical 
community taken more notice of these arguments, the present article would be 
unnecessary. 
72 Cohen, supra note 1, at 822. 
73 Id. at 823. 
74 Id. at 822. 
75 Id. at 823. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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meaningless displays of conceptual acrobatics.”78 
Although Cohen was advocating a functional approach to 
jurisprudence, there is no reason why such an approach would not 
be equally applicable to philosophical questions such as whether 
moral responsibility may be ascribed to corporations. Cohen 
himself was aware that “the problem of eliminating supernatural 
terms and meaningless questions and redefining concepts and 
problems in terms of verifiable realities is not a problem peculiar 
to law.”79 If terms such as “Due Process, Police Power, and similar 
word-charms of constitutional law”80 are supernatural concepts, it 
is reasonable to believe that terms such as “corporate action” and 
“corporate intent” may be as well. And if “Where is a 
corporation?” is a meaningless question, a good case can be made 
that so are questions such as “What does a corporation intend?” or 
“Do corporations act autonomously?” or “Are corporations value 
sensitive?” Such questions can only be answered by demonstrating 
that one abstract concept either can or cannot be predicated onto 
another; an activity which, on the basis of the philosophical debate 
described in Part I, certainly seems to invite impressive “displays 
of conceptual acrobatics.”81 
Applying Cohen’s functional approach to the question of the 
moral responsibility of corporations would require us to ask what 
the practical consequences of ascribing such responsibility to 
corporations would be and whether the resulting situation would be 
just. Thus, we would begin our inquiry by asking what the point of 
holding corporations morally responsible is in the first place—that 
is, what difference does assigning moral responsibility to 
corporations make in the world? Once this has been determined, 
we would then have to evaluate whether we would be ethically 
justified in thus altering the state of the world. Interestingly, a 
close attention to these questions reveals that ascribing moral 
responsibility to corporations is ethically justified only when it is 
practically meaningless.  
Consider Cohen’s first question. What is the point of holding 
                                                          
78 Id. at 824. 
79 Id. at 822. 
80 Id. at 823. 
81 Id. at 824. 
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corporations morally responsible? What is the practical effect of 
doing so? The obvious answer is that doing so authorizes the 
infliction of punishment on the corporation as a collective entity.82 
If this were not the case, it is not clear why anyone other than 
philosophers bent on resolving a difficult semantic issue would 
care whether corporations can bear moral responsibility. Unless 
assigning moral responsibility to corporations makes them liable to 
punishment, there is no practical difference between a world with 
corporate moral responsibility and a world without it.  
There is, of course, nothing wrong with ascribing moral 
responsibility to corporations when doing so does not authorize the 
imposition of punishment upon them. In such a case, the ascription 
of corporate moral responsibility would merely express a moral 
judgment about the institutional arrangements within the 
corporation.  
It is commonplace today to recognize that corporations have an 
ethical culture or “ethos.”83 A corporation’s ethos—which arises 
from the combination of the organization’s internal structural 
features and the observable behavior of its senior officers and 
leaders—affects the conduct of the corporation’s employees. 
Corporations with a good corporate ethos tend to encourage ethical 
conduct by their employees. Corporations with a poor corporate 
ethos, at best, fail to encourage ethical conduct, and at worst, 
incentivize irresponsible or dishonest conduct. Thus, a strong 
commitment to the maintenance of high ethical standards by senior 
corporate leaders, coupled with rewards for employees who live up 
to those standards, can significantly decrease the likelihood of 
unethical conduct within the firm. In contrast, an organization 
whose senior officials are seen to cut ethical corners makes it more 
likely that lower-level employees will do so as well. Similarly, a 
corporation with a clearly demarcated avenue by which employees 
                                                          
82 It would also authorize the distribution of rewards to corporations. Moral 
responsibility implies that one is liable to both moral blame and moral praise. 
However, in the present context, the focus is usually on whether corporations 
may be held liable for wrongdoing rather than a proper recipient of reward. 
Hence, for purposes of concision, I will speak strictly in terms of liability for 
wrongdoing in the remainder of this article. 
83 See Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121–27 (1991). 
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can report their ethical concerns will have more ability to prevent 
employee wrongdoing than one beset by “organizational blocks,” 
such as a strict line of command or diffuse decision-making 
authority, that make it more difficult for employees to ensure that 
they are behaving properly themselves and to report on the 
unethical behavior of others.84 
When a poor corporate ethos is a causal factor in producing 
unethical action by the firm’s employees, it is natural to assign 
blame to the corporation. For example, several commentators cite 
Enron’s “rank and yank” compensation system as a significant 
element in a corporate ethos that encouraged unethical conduct by 
Enron’s traders.85 Under this system, the traders were ranked 
against each other on the basis of how much money they brought 
in, with the top performers receiving large bonuses and those 
ranked in the bottom 10–15 percent being fired. By elevating 
financial performance above all other considerations, this 
compensation system encouraged the traders to ignore ethical and 
legal constraints in pursuit of revenue. Under these circumstances, 
it is perfectly intelligible to say that by thus establishing and 
maintaining a poor corporate ethos, Enron was morally responsible 
for the unethical actions of its traders. 
There is nothing objectionable about attributing moral 
responsibility to corporations in this sense, as long as one is not 
claiming that the corporation is thereby subject to punishment as a 
collective entity. But there are also no practical consequences of 
doing so. This is simply another example of the semantic 
convenience provided by the use of abstract collective nouns. 
Saying that corporations are morally responsible for the effects of 
their corporate ethos is merely linguistic shorthand for the more 
cumbersome statements that the organizational structure of 
corporations affects the behavior of its individual employees and 
that managers have a moral obligation to maintain an ethical 
                                                          
84 See James A. Waters, Catch 20.5: Corporate Morality as an 
Organizational Phenomenon, in CONTEMPORARY MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN 
BUSINESS. 160 (A. Pablo Iannone ed., 1989). 
85 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: 
Considering Fault-based Liability for the Complicit Corporation, 44 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1343, 1352 (2007); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and 
Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 942 (2007). 
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corporate culture. Any such assertion of moral responsibility is 
fully translatable into assertions about human psychology and the 
ethical obligations of individuals. There is no harm in speaking in 
this way, but doing so makes no practical difference in the world. 
It does not instruct or authorize human beings to behave differently 
than they would if the more cumbersome phrasing were employed. 
When used in this way, the ascription of moral responsibility to 
corporations is ethically unobjectionable, but practically 
meaningless.  
In contrast, when moral responsibility carries with it liability to 
punishment, ascribing moral responsibility to corporations is rife 
with practical consequences. The Arthur Andersen accounting firm 
survived the individual guilty plea of David Duncan, the leader of 
its Enron “engagement team,” on a charge of obstruction of justice, 
but was destroyed when indicted for the same offense in its 
corporate capacity, resulting in the loss of over 85,000 jobs 
worldwide.86 Indeed, it is primarily because of the practical 
consequences of being able to inflict punishment on corporations 
that the advocates of corporate moral responsibility advance their 
position. Such advocates frequently argue that the threat of 
corporate punishment can encourage corporations to take steps to 
prevent wrongdoing by its agents,87 and that the imposition of 
corporate punishment can express public disapproval of any such 
wrongdoing that does occur. In addition, imposing punishment on 
corporations clearly has a negative impact on the financial 
                                                          
86 See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of 
the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 109 (2006). 
87 It is worth noting that this claim is not obviously correct. In the absence 
of corporate moral responsibility, corporations are nevertheless civilly liable for 
the wrongs of their employees. Any intentional wrongdoing or reckless conduct 
by corporate employees that harm the interests of third parties subjects the 
corporation to potentially massive compensatory and punitive damage awards. It 
is not obvious that the threat of the relatively small criminal penalties that would 
be added if corporations could be held morally responsible as well would add 
any noticeable deterrent effect. This article assumes that the threat of corporate 
punishment can produce increased efforts at corporate self-policing. This will 
certainly be the case with regard to regulatory violations or other infractions that 
do not directly harm third parties where the threat of civil liability is not present; 
and because of the damaging effect criminal charges can have on a corporation’s 
reputation, it may well be the case generally. 
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condition of several of the corporation’s stakeholder groups. 
Hence, to the extent that the attribution of moral responsibility to 
corporations renders them liable to punishment, it has significant 
practical consequences. 
But this is precisely where the argument for corporate moral 
responsibility founders. For under the functional approach, after 
identifying the difference assigning moral responsibility to 
corporations would make in the world, we must pass on to Cohen’s 
second question and ask whether thus changing the world is 
ethically justified. And when we do, we find that imposing 
punishment on corporate entities is inherently unjust.  
In the first place, it is impossible to punish a corporation. At 
some point in every academic article on corporate responsibility, 
the author trots out the old saw that a corporation has “no soul to 
be damned, and no body to be kicked.”88 The present Article has 
reached that point. This oft-quoted phrase is merely an ancient 
recognition of Cohen’s observation that a corporation is not a 
thing. It is impossible to punish a corporation because there is 
nothing—no thing—there to absorb the punishment. Any 
punishment directed toward a corporation necessarily passes 
through its mythical facade to fall on some set of human beings.   
Further, any punishment directed toward a corporation is 
necessarily financial in nature. Not only can’t corporations be 
kicked, they can’t be incarcerated. They may be fined, which 
constitutes the direct application of a financial penalty. They may 
have licenses revoked or otherwise have their freedom to transact 
business restricted, but such measures merely constitute the 
indirect application of a financial penalty—they are punitive only 
to the extent that they reduce the corporation’s profitability. They 
may be liquidated, which can be thought of as a corporate death 
sentence. But since corporations are not literally living things, any 
“execution” is entirely metaphorical. Liquidation is to be feared 
only because of the financial losses that result from it.  
Who pays when any such punitive financial loss is imposed 
upon a corporation? To the extent that the loss can be passed along 
                                                          
88 See John C. Coffee, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 386, 386 (1981). 
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through increases in the price of the corporation’s products, it is 
the consumers who pay. To the extent that the corporation can 
assimilate the loss by reducing labor costs, it is the employees who 
pay. And to the extent that the corporation is unable to pass along 
the loss to either of these groups, it is the owners of the 
corporation, the shareholders, who pay.   
The characteristic that all of these stakeholder groups share is 
that their members are innocent of personal wrongdoing. 
Consumers obviously play no role in any wrongdoing by corporate 
agents. The employees who lose their jobs due to corporate 
retrenchment may have had nothing whatever to do with the 
wrongdoing and been completely unaware of it. And given that the 
defining characteristic of the modern corporation is the separation 
of ownership and control, the shareholders likely had no 
knowledge of or control over the behavior of the employees who 
engaged in the wrongdoing. Corporate punishment necessarily falls 
indiscriminately on the innocent as well as or in place of the guilty. 
Corporate punishment is inherently vicarious collective 
punishment. 
Little argument should be required to establish that such 
punishment is unjust. The thing that distinguishes punishment from 
the naked infliction of harm is that punishment is deserved. 
Punishment is punishment only when it is imposed in response to 
some fault on the part of the party being subjected to it. Unless this 
is the case, “punishment” is nothing more than coercion. That is 
why, on the international level, collective punishment is considered 
a human rights violation89 and is banned as a war crime by the 
Geneva convention.90 Although the wrong of imposing financial 
collective punishment on a corporation’s stakeholders may be an 
order of magnitude less severe than that of the war crimes 
addressed by the Geneva Convention, the two wrongs are 
indistinguishable in principle.  
                                                          
89 See American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(3) Pact of San José, 
July 18, 1978, 1144 UNTS 123 (“Punishment shall not be extended to any 
person other than the criminal.”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, art. 7, Oct. 21, 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (“Punishment is 
personal and can be imposed only on the offender.”). 
90 See Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, art. 33(1), 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
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A handful of the employees at Arthur Andersen engaged in 
conduct that the government believed constituted obstruction of 
justice. Each of these employees was subject to indictment, 
conviction, and punishment for the offense as an individual. By 
indicting the firm for their conduct, the government destroyed the 
company; costing 85,000 employees in 390 offices around the 
world their jobs.91 Almost all of these employees were personally 
innocent of wrongdoing.92 It is difficult to see how assigning moral 
responsibility to corporations can be ethically justified if the 
practical consequence of doing so is that secretaries in France get 
fired for the conduct of executives in Texas.  
Enron is the poster child for corporate corruption. If any 
corporation could be deserving of punishment, it would have to be 
Enron. Yet no effort was ever made to punish Enron as a corporate 
entity. Why? The obvious answer is that it would be patently 
unjust to impose punishment on Enron’s shareholders who 
constituted the bulk of the innocent victims of the crimes 
committed by Enron’s employees.  
Advocates of corporate moral responsibility frequently argue 
that the ability to visit punishment on corporations as collective 
entities can deter wrongdoing. Fear of corporate punishment can 
motivate managers to institute compliance programs and make 
efforts to maintain a good corporate ethos that can reduce 
wrongdoing by employees. I have no doubt that this is correct. The 
threat of collective punishment is indeed an effective way to 
motivate people to suppress undesirable conduct by others. That is 
almost always its purpose. Collective punishment can deter. The 
problem is not that collective punishment is not effective. It’s that 
it is not just.  
Deterrence can be a legitimate purpose of punishment. There is 
nothing ethically objectionable about imposing punishment on a 
wrongdoer to discourage others from behaving in a similar way. 
By associating punishment with transgression, we hope to cause 
                                                          
91 See Ainslie, supra note 86, at 109. 
92 In fact, all of Andersen’s employees were innocent of criminal 
wrongdoing because the Supreme Court overturned Andersen’s conviction on 
the ground that the government had not proven the consciousness of wrongdoing 
required by the crime. See generally Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 
U.S. 696 (2005). 
 Where Is Felix Cohen When We Need Him? 79 
others to refrain from transgressing for fear of a similar sanction. 
But this form of deterrence is distinct in kind from the form that 
consists of threatening to punish those who are innocent of 
wrongdoing to pressure them into suppressing the undesirable 
conduct of their fellow citizens.  
The world would be a better place if we could more effectively 
deter crimes committed by teenagers. And we undoubtedly could 
do so by threatening to punish the teenagers’ parents for their 
children’s offenses. We do not do so because we recognize that 
such punishment is no different in principle from the more venal 
and obviously unacceptable practice of the Nazis, who sought to 
deter acts of resistance by punishing innocent members of the 
communities in which such acts occurred. Threatening the 
innocent stakeholders of a corporation with punishment for the 
wrongdoing of culpable employees in order to force corporate 
managers to engage in more intensive self-policing is not ethically 
distinct from threatening to punish the innocent members of a 
family or a community for the wrongdoing of their relatives or 
fellow community members. 
Advocates of corporate moral responsibility also frequently 
argue that inflicting punishment on corporations can be a useful 
means of expressing society’s disapproval of the conduct 
committed by its employees in its name, and thus serves the 
“expressive function of punishment.”93 As with the claim 
regarding deterrence, I do not doubt that this is true. But my 
objection remains the same. Although it may be an effective way 
of expressing disapproval, it is not a just way of doing so.  
An essential characteristic of punishment that distinguishes it 
from other penalties may indeed be that “punishment is a 
conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment 
and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, 
on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in 
whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”94 There is nothing 
ethically objectionable about visiting punishment on a wrongdoer 
in order to express disapproval of his or her conduct. But this is 
                                                          
93 See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 
MONIST 397 (1965). 
94 Id. at 400. 
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different in kind from punishing those who are innocent of 
wrongdoing in order to express resentment and indignation toward 
the conduct of others with whom they are somehow associated. 
History repeatedly teaches the evil of punishing on the basis of 
guilt by association. The investigations of the House Un-American 
Activities Committee and the blacklist of the 1950s illustrate the 
injustice of condemning people because they are associated with 
others who may be engaged in unacceptable conduct. Riots 
directed against African-American communities in the segregated 
South were extraordinarily effective means of expressing the larger 
community’s condemnation of the crimes committed by the 
individual members of those communities. Collective punishment 
is undoubtedly an effective means of expressing society’s 
condemnation of individual wrongdoing. But it is not a just one.  
Corporate punishment is vicarious collective punishment. 
Collective punishment is inherently unjust. Hence, to the extent 
that assigning moral responsibility to corporations authorizes 
corporate punishment, corporate moral responsibility is unjust. 
And it cannot be redeemed by demonstrating that it is effective at 
increasing corporate self-policing or at denouncing wrongdoing. 
For collective punishment involves punishing the innocent to attain 
a desired societal end, and as such is incompatible with the Kantian 
insight that lies at the heart of any liberal society—that individuals 
may not be used merely as means to the ends of others or of 
society as a whole. When the practical significance of corporate 
moral responsibility is to pass the harm associated with corporate 
punishment through to the corporation’s stakeholders whether they 
deserve it or not, corporate moral responsibility is ethically 
pernicious and must be eschewed.  
CONCLUSION 
In 1935, Felix Cohen pointed out the absurdity of attempting to 
determine the state in which a corporation was subject to lawsuit 
by answering the abstract, empirically meaningless question: 
Where is a corporation? Seventy-five years later, philosophers are 
attempting to determine whether corporations should be subject to 
punishment as collective entities by answering abstract, 
empirically meaningless questions such as: Do corporations act 
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autonomously or have intentions or demonstrate value sensitivity? 
Although these may be fascinating philosophical questions, their 
answers require no consideration of either the practical 
consequences of imposing punishment on corporations or the 
ethical acceptability of doing so. By thus attempting to derive an 
empirically significant conclusion purely from the examination of 
the relationships among abstract concepts, the contemporary 
philosophical debate over corporate moral responsibility 
constitutes a 21st century example of Cohen’s transcendental 
nonsense.  
In this Article, I have suggested that the proper response to 
questions about the intentions, autonomy, or value sensitivity of 
corporations is: Who cares? Looked at in terms of its practical 
significance, the attribution of moral responsibility to corporations 
allows for only two possibilities. Corporate moral responsibility 
either authorizes corporate punishment or it does not.  
If it does not, then corporate moral responsibility is merely a 
linguistically useful device for directing attention to the 
psychological effects an organization’s structure can have on the 
behavior of the individuals who comprise it and the corresponding 
obligation of corporate managers to attempt to maintain a positive 
corporate ethos. In this case, corporate moral responsibility is 
ethically unobjectionable, but practically meaningless.  
However, if corporate moral responsibility does authorize 
corporate punishment, then it authorizes a form of vicarious 
collective punishment that inflicts evil on those who are personally 
innocent of wrongdoing in order to achieve a desired societal goal. 
In this case, corporate moral responsibility has great practical 
significance, but is ethically pernicious. For no matter how worthy 
the societal goal, fundamental ethical principles place some means 
of achieving them, such as punishing the innocent, off limits.  
We fail to recognize this only because our ability to see a 
“thing” that is not there—the corporation—obscures our vision of 
the things that are there—individual human beings each of whom 
possesses a fundamental moral entitlement not to be used merely 
as means to the ends of others. This is the danger of the 
“thingification” of abstract concepts that Felix Cohen warned us 
about seventy-five years ago. It is also the reason that the most 
important question among those that have been examined in this 
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Article is the one contained in its title.  
 
